This post is not speculating on the guilt or motivations of the suspects. You can get all of that from other sources. Since these two conflicts have just been hurled forward into the public eye, this is a quick catch-up. We are in no way implicating the regions or ethnic groups from these regions in the crimes committed. We are simply trying to shed light on the complex history of the regions so people can better understand them before conflating them with other parts of the world that are associated, rightly or wrongly, with extremism.

Chechnya and Dagestan are NOT the same place. Both are republics within Russia in the Northern Caucasus regions, south of Moscow and north of Georgia.

Image via euroheritage.net

To reiterate: these are two separate territories, with many different conflicts, insurgencies and militant groups. Both countries have separatist conflicts (to gain full independence from Russia) and both countries experienced violence related to Islamism.

This is a complicated region and not suited to generalization. Dagestan is one of the most ethnically heterogeneous regions in the world and the most diverse republic in the Russian territories with at least 10 different groups claiming to be indigenous to the region and 30 spoken languages. Chechnya is more homogeneous, with a 2010 Russian census placing the ethnic make up to be 95% Chechen, followed by ethnic Russians.

Chechnya actually invaded Dagestan in 1999 in an effort to support a local separatist movement. This launched the 2nd Chechen War – leading us into the complex conflicts in Chechnya and Dagestan.

These are primarily local conflicts, rooted in separatism from Russia.

Background on Chechen conflict: Although officially an autonomous republic within Russia, Chechnya has consistently defied Russian rule. Chechnya was first taken by force by Russia in 1858. During the Soviet Stalin years hundreds of thousands of Chechens and Ingushetians (another ethnic group in the region) were deported to Siberia for supposed ties to Nazi fascists. Thousands perished in the process. In 1957, Khrushchev re-established the Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic and allowed the indigenous populations to return.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the republic again sought to secure its independence from Russian control, adopting its own constitution. Shortly thereafter in 1994, Russia invaded killing up to 100,000 Chechens, many of whom were civilians, women and children. In 2000, under Putin’s rule Russia captured Grozny (the Chechen capital) and declared it to officially be under Moscow’s rule. The 2000s saw a series of terrorist strikes followed by Russian retaliations ending in “normalization” in 2009 under Medvedev’s presidency.

Background on conflict in Dagestan: Conflict in Dagestan has been brutal for decades. It is related to corruption, separatism, and Islamism. As previously mentioned, though Dagestani authorities attempted to prevent the turbulence seen in Chechnya, there was violent spillover when Chechen militants invaded in 1999. Though Chechnya is quieter now, Dagestan is considered Russia’s secret war, but there are near-daily attacks by militants on police or vice versa. Russian counter-terrorism operations occur regularly. The reports from Dagestan, which are scarce, indicate that the territory is increasingly struggling with Islamist insurgency, but it cannot be seperated from anger at Moscow and local authorities over pervasive corruption, human rights violations and ties to criminal organizations. To call the conflict in Dagestan merely an ‘Islamist’ conflict is to gravely oversimplify the issue:

“Instead of reforming the court system, so independent courts could prosecute those who abduct and execute people in this part of Russia, Moscow assigns thugs, men known for their criminal background, to leading positions at security agencies, who pay million-dollar kickbacks to the insurgency in order to save their lives,” said Gagzhimurad Omarov, a former member of parliament from Dagestan who stepped down last fall and has now joined the opposition. It’s a paradox that Moscow refuses to address. At the same time Putin has declared a zero-tolerance policy for militant activity in Dagestan, the officials he has appointed are paying protection money to the insurgency, which has often targeted Russian officials.(From Foreign Policy’s Anna Nemtsova, linked above)

The main takeaway? Do not make any assumptions about these regions or the people in them – so few people truly understand them, including ourselves.

The trial has already been adjourned until April 24, barely a week after it began on April 17. These accusations and possibility of trial have been brought to court, dismissed, open, closed – have we brought you a story yet that wasn’t complicated? Here’s the basics:

Navalny at a rally in St. Petersburg February 25, 2012

Who is Aleksei Navalny? Navalny is an opposition figure in Russia that made a name for himself using digital activism and transparency to showcase corruption in the government. He became popular through his blogs, which showcased corruption at the corporate level, and then took on Putin’s United Russia party, ‘rebranding’ them as ‘crooks and swindlers.’

So they are accusing him of….what? Theft. RFE/RL succinctly states:  “Navalny, 36, is accused of the theft of 16 million rubles ($510,000) from a timber firm in Kirov, when he was working for Kirov’s governor.”

Did he steal from the timber firm? It appears that Navalny was framed. He defends himself through the same methods that made him famous - transparency and controlling the digital message by displaying data online. In this case, Navalny posted all of his court documents online, encouraged the public to decide for themselves and stressed his modest apartment he lives in, his simple car and the fact that he sends his kids to public school. This interview was meant to ask the public, if he stole so much money, where is it (in essence)?

His average lifestyle also serves to make him more relatable to the common person in Moscow, as compared to the political elite who are known to benefit from government kickbacks.

Can he actually ‘win’ his case? That depends on how you define winning. The court in Kirov will almost certainly convict Navalny if the trial reaches that stage. However¸if you don’t define winning by what the Russian courts declare, Navalny stated in an interview with reporters prior to the trial that he defined winning a bit differently:

We will definitely win this case. No matter what the ruling is, I am absolutely confident that we will prove our innocence and it will be clear to everybody that this is a political trial.

So if he is convicted – what then? Navalny suspects he’ll be put in jail for at least some time, and the courts have threatened to imprison him for a decade for the theft charges. However, this is likely to give him something of a ‘martyr’ status among his followers. In December 2011, Navalny spoke to a

The 10 December 2011 protests in Moscow, photo from James Hill for the NY Times

crowd of 80,000 in Moscow – the biggest demonstration since the fall of the Soviet Union. While it’s not a clear measure of importance, Navalny does have a large following on social media – over 346,000 followers on Twitter. This trial is likely to largely be seen as a political spectacle, making Putin look weaker for putting Navalny on trial.

For more on the impact of this trial, The Atlantic has a great article discussing why this trial will define Putin’s third term, and just how weak the trial makes Putin look:

Indeed, Navalny’s trial could turn out to be the mirror image of the 2003 Khodorkovsky case, which helped consolidate and strengthen Vladimir Putin’s ruling elite by sending a message that politically uncooperative tycoons would be dealt with harshly.

Khodorkovsky’s prosecution also played well with the public, which was weary of the wild capitalism of the 1990s and supportive of cracking down on the oligarchs who defined that era.

The Navalny case is doing the opposite. It is fracturing the elite and sending a message that the Kremlin is desperate and frightened of a blogger with a cult following who made his name exposing graft in high places.

What’s the catch? In the Guardian article linked to previously, Tom Parfitt points out some unsettling affiliations between Navalny and nationalist groups, and an analyst from the Carnegie Endowment points out Navalny’s desire to please via populism is, in some ways, not that different from Putin:

Yet Navalny’s more nationalist views are troubling. Last year he spoke at the Russky Marsh, where some protesters made Nazi salutes. He has also endorsed a movement called Enough of Feeding the Caucasus, which protests against the theft of state funding but which critics see as xenophobic. And a video that Navalny recorded for Narod several years ago called for arming the population to shoot Chechen bandits.

Shevtsova believes the lawyer could yet become a destructive force. “We don’t know what he thinks strategically,” she said. “He seems to have a bouillon of incompatible beliefs because he is a populist and wants to please everybody. In this ideologicial pragmatism, he is no different to another Russian politician: Vladimir Putin.”

 But – all of that being said and noted, it still stands that an opposition leader is on trial after likely being framed. The point of that trial is to scare other opposition leaders with the threat of jail and to quiet one of the loudest voices in the anti-United Russia (Putin’s political party) opposition. So much like last year’s debacle with Pussy Riot, this case is likely to make it all the more clear that Putin cares less and less about the veneer of democracy in Russia and more about keeping those who are unhappy quiet.

Since the violence in the remote region of Gorno-Badakhshan in July of 2012, there’s been not-so-subtle crackdown on opposition, increased restrictions of online activity and now two prominent activists disappearing within days of each other. With elections planned for November, it is hard not to see the sudden disappearances as harbingers of things to come. While the outcome of the Tajik election is pretty much guaranteed (Rahmon, the current President is expected to retain his office), in the past the Rahmon government has ensured that opposition leaders were detained or imprisoned. This election season looks like it will be more of the same. From EurasiaNet:

 A pattern appears to be emerging. Last month, in Kiev, former Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullojonov, who has been living as a refugee in the United States for about a decade, was arrested on an old Interpol warrant. Dushanbe wishes to try him for attempting to assassinate Rakhmon.

 The two opposition figures missing since March 15 are:

Salimboy Shamsiddinov:  Shamsiddinov was a leading figure in the Uzbek community. Uzbeks are a minority ethnic group in Tajikistan, and Shamsiddinov accused both the Tajik and Uzbek governments of mistreating their ethnic minorities. He disappeared from the Tajik province of Khatlon, first reported March 15. RFE/RL points out that he recently called for Uzbeks living in Tajikistan to support an opposition candidate in November’s election.

Umarali Quvatov*: A very successful former businessman in Tajikistan, Quvatov fled Tajikistan in summer 2012 fearing arrest by the Tajik authorities. After leaving, he founded an opposition political party and became very active in digital protest. In December 2012, he was arrested by Dubai police and until his disappearance, was held in a Dubai detention center.

It is worrying to note that Tajikistan’s attempts to stifle opposition crossed borders in Ukraine, Russia and now the United Arab Emirates – in addition to the domestic crackdown on the internet and the media. Tajikistan’s population is understandably risk-averse after their violent civil war, and this is likely to mean governmental overreach will continue to go unchecked.

*I highly recommend reading the linked Global Voices article for context and primary sources on Quvatov’s disappearance and the larger context of opposition in Tajikistan. 

Apologies to our readers for the recent slow-down in posting, we are both snowed under at our day jobs currently. However, we have ‘On the Ground’ interviews in the pipeline we’re excited about and four blog posts planned and outlined, so stay tuned and thank you for your patience! 

According to RFE/RL, there are between 10-12 million migrant workers in Russia, the majority of whom work in the shadow economy. Foreign Policy, Human Rights Watch and EurasiaNet have all commented in recent weeks on the worsening situation for these migrants. A quick round-up of those stories follows

A quick overview of the issue from RFE/RL: This is a good starting point to understand the scale and depth of the problem.

“‘Every year it becomes harder,’ Takhirov says. ‘It used to be easy to find work quickly — you didn’t need any documents or anything. But nowadays you fill out all the documents and then they still deceive you and throw you out all the same. There is so much deceit everywhere.’ That deceit includes things like nonpayment of wages, exorbitant bribes to obtain work permits, and arbitrary detentions by police.”

Foreign Policy’s Anna Nemtsova offers a visceral look at the issue, including the violent measures employed by right-wing nationalist movements. Most worrying, it was President Putin himself who called on the masses to form ‘patrol groups’ to help the federal government crack down on immigration. However, as this article from Syracuse’s Impunity Watch points out, the Russian government claims they screen everyone involved in this volunteer force so that aggressive nationalists aren’t employed. Here, have some salt to take that with.

A quick quote from Nemtsova’s well-written article: “

The “People’s Patrols” proposal is part of a package of other Soviet-style regulations tightening rules requiring police registration at certain addresses and an anti-gay propaganda law. “This is not the revival of patriotism, but a revival of nationalism, as clearly patrols will target a concrete enemy: particular ethnic groups,” said Alexander Verkhovsky, the director of the Sova Center, a group that monitors xenophobia and ethnic violence. The latest Sova survey describes almost 200 cases of attacks apparently motivated by xenophobia. The group’s experts say that there is clear evidence of a trend for the worse.”

EurasiaNet’s posting by Genesee Keevil looks at the conditions experienced by the workers, including interviews with migrant workers and their families back in their home countries. Her post also includes the heartbreaking stories from women in Tajikistan whose husbands leave for Russia, don’t return and the much-needed remittances stop coming, either because they don’t care, are killed or simply can’t get back. Her first line captures the bleakness of the situation very clearly and simply: “Each day an average of three Tajiks return from Russia in simple wooden coffins. They are the victims of racist attacks, police brutality, dangerous working conditions and unsafe housing.”

Finally, Human Rights Watch recently put out a report discussing working conditions for migrant workers specific to the problems surrounding the Sochi Olympics in 2014. Putin’s made it very clear that he is heavily invested in these Olympics going off perfectly and using them to demonstrate Russia’s international prowess and capability. However, as other CES posts have demonstrated, there is definitely a seething shadow economy based on exploitation accompanying the Games:

“All migrant workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Sochi said that they worked long hours with very few days off. Work sites maintained a system of two 12-hour shifts. Workers most often said they worked from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. or from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m., with a one-hour break for meals and for changing into and out of work gear. They typically worked seven days a week, with just one day off every two weeks, for long stretches. Russian law specifies a 40-hour work week, overtime pay, and at least one day off per week.”

All of this to say that the situation for immigrants in Russia is clearly deteriorating but there is little to no hope for any changes in the immediate future. Migrant workers feel they have little choice other than to look to Russia for economic opportunity, even at the expense of their rights and dignity. Putin’s concessions to nationalist politics, embodied by the creation of volunteer anti-immigration patrols have exacerbated already-poor conditions for workers.

At the SAIS event

On 13 February 2013, the John’s Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (CACI) held a panel event on the accession of the Central Asian countries to the WTO.  Ambassadors from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were all present:

Kairat Umarov, ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the U.S.;

Muktar Djumaliev, ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic to the U.S.;

Nuriddin Shamsov, ambassador of the Republic of Tajikistan to the U.S.;

llhom Nematov, ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the U.S.;

In addition, Mara Burr, deputy assistant U.S. trade representative for South and Central Asia in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; and Laurie Curry, director for Central Asia in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative were also present to discuss their experiences with the technical and diplomatic negotiations with the accession process. Dr. Frederick Starr, the Chairman at CACI moderated the discussion.

Perhaps most the most interesting facet of this discussion was Ambassador Nematov of Uzbekistan’s defense of the country’s choice to abstain from the WTO accession process. Nematov stated that right now, it would do more harm than good for the country, particularly the agricultural and automotive sectors of the economy (he cited a USAID study that reached these conclusions that we would love to see if anyone can find it!). Recent GM foreign direct investment has helped grant the country incremental progress toward its stated goal of economic diversification away from cotton.  When pressed on this issue, Nematov stated that Uzbekistan did want to join the WTO for the sake of joining, but rather when they had more to gain from accession than lose. However, he repeatedly reassured the audience that Uzbekistan did value WTO membership and hoped to join at some point.

Kazakhstan echoed similar concerns about the cost of joining the WTO, but their ambassador approached the issue with political concerns being the primary reason for their lengthy accession negotiations – Kazakhstan submitted their application to join the WTO in 1996. Ambassador Umarov stated that while they hope to join the WTO in 2013, their current robust trade agreements and position as a “logistical hub” in Central Asia give them numerous interests that have created friction with accession requirements and slowed negotiations.  With an economy bolstered by significant hydrocarbon wealth and transit rents, Kazakhstan has preferred to dig their heels in against WTO. However, the ambassador stated they have submitted their protocols for multilateral discussion, and are looking forward to joining the WTO.  Umarov mentioned that Kazakhstan is increasingly hoping to develop a formula to harmonize tariff levels with its numerous trading partners to prevent line item-by-line item arguments from driving negotiations to a standstill.

Audience members turned the discussion about the costs and benefits of joining the WTO to Kyrgyzstan, which, according to Ambassador Djumaliev, had to expend political capital in their negotiations, particularly in the agricultural sector.  Farmers were incensed about new expensive requirements to meet international quality standards.  When asked if the benefits of joining the WTO outweighed the cost, he said yes because of the predictability of the business climate but, interestingly, that Kyrgyzstan was still hamstrung until its Central Asian neighbours joined the WTO. He attributed this to the large amount of trade Kyrgyzstan currently does with their neighbours.  Until all nations in the region are following the same multilateral agreements the benefits of WTO member status will not be realized.

As the newest member of the WTO, the ambassador from Tajikistan, Ambassador Nuriddin Shamsov, didn’t contribute to the cost/benefit analysis with respect to his country and instead simply outlined Tajikistan’s application achievements. Tajikistan applied for membership in 2001, and after 11 years of negotiations will be joining the WTO on 2 March 2013. Ambaddador Shamsov stated that he hoped the WTO would bring vitality to the energy industry, strengthen food security and help the country navigate the communications deadlock they are in.  Undoubtedly Tajikistan has taken keen notice of the successes and failures Kyrgyzstan faced in its own accession.  As a similarly small, landlocked, natural resource-poor mountainous nation, the Tajik experience is likely to strongly resemble that of its neighbour.

The USTR reps highlighted the importance of including Afghanistan in trade agreements and when thinking of Central Asia as a region. Due to the ongoing US conflict, Afghanistan (and Pakistan) are often lumped into their own region in casual discussion, ignoring the affect the country has on trade, both illicit and legal, and the benefits that the other Central Asian countries could enjoy should trade relations improve and the economy stabilize. Mara Burr emphasized this in her discussion of including Afghanistan in a trade investment framework agreement (TIFA) in the region – they now hold observer status of all council meetings for that TIFA. One thing Burr pointed out was the emphasis on women’s economic empowerment in 2011 and 2012. Laurie Curry, discussing the technical side and impacts of WTO accession (she is the director for Central Asia in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative), gave context to this very high level discussion, examining the process of accession and how countries capitalize on membership.

Regarding the institutional impacts of WTO membership in general, the USTR reps also highlighted how smaller countries, once in, become dependent on WTO rules and norms.  Smaller nations depending more heavily on import/export flows are likely to become the greatest champions for rules enforcement and for bringing their trade partners into the Organization.  As Ambassador Djumaliev pointed out, Kygyzstan will not fully enjoy the benefits of member status until its trade partners and neighbours join and are forced to play by the same rules.  Involvement in WTO proceedings also gives countries a seat at the table for discussion and negotiations of importance for their economies.  Finally, Laurie Curry stressed that WTO membership is a sign that a country has received an international “stamp of approval” and is “open for business”.

Many thanks to CACI for organizing the event.

Pascal Lamy, Chairman of the WTO said that Tajikistan accession will “send a clear signal to all its partners that Tajikistan is willing to play by global rules.”  The rules referred to include:

1. Non-discrimination in trade agreements
2. Reciprocity
3. Binding and enforceable commitments
4. Transparency
5. Safety valves

Wikipedia can give you the breakdown of what these entail.  Lamy’s statement speaks to the transparency that full WTO compliance could bring to Tajikistan.  Meanwhile the Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Sharif Rahimzoda’s hopes that ascension forecasts prosperity for the country—as neoclassical economics would have us believe—however, similar experiences have not produced idyllic results.  Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian nation to join the WTO in 1998.  Also an impoverished, relatively resource-scarce mountain nation, the lessons from its experience should be critically examined when anticipating future impacts in Tajikistan. 

When import tariffs collapsed, Chinese goods flooded into Kyrgyz marketplaces driving out domestic producers and concentrating wealth into the hands of those who could negotiate the best import contracts from outside.  While economists laud this move as a wakeup call to economies that forces them to recognize their comparative advantage in the global marketplace and reallocate resources accordingly, the friction of transition is undeniable.  Further, not all nations are equipped to fully capture their comparative advantage.  In Tajikistan’s case hydropower exploitation and export could provide a dramatic boom to the economy; however, neighboring Uzbekistan downstream regards dam building as a threat to its own national security.  In this case capitalizing on a comparative advantage could, ironically, leave Tajikistan worse off if regional disagreements can’t be assuaged.

In Tajikistan’s case, WTO accession similarly risks exposing nascent domestic industries (agriculture and textiles) to heightened price competition.  If significant dislocation occurs—which can be expected—two outcomes are possible and not mutually exclusive: 1) more Tajik men leave the country to work in other Central Asian countries and Russia where job markets are stronger or 2) unemployment increases along with the probability of civil unrest.  Scenario 1 would lead to divided families, remittance incomes that are subject to international currency movements and a perpetuation of the brain drain plaguing Tajikistan.  Scenario 2 could imply rioting or increased pressure to traffic in narcotics from Afghanistan.

Falling domestic output and rising imports would also stimulate an increase of Tajikistan’s trade deficit, as happened in Kyrgyzstan, and put further downward pressure on the exchange rate.  While this will help those families living off remittances from abroad (because foreign currencies will buy more Somoni), while import goods that average Tajik citizens rely on such as fuel, clothing and electronics will become relatively more expensive. 

The World Bank lists Tajikistan’s low rate of private investment as its biggest hurdle to economic development in years to come.  The greatest benefit Tajikistan can expect in the near term is greater consideration for foreign direct investment in mining, hydrocarbon extraction (if such stores become proven), textile production and farming.  The mandatory regulatory reforms that come with WTO accession will make Tajikistan a bit more favorable in the eyes of multinational corporations, however, Dushanbe will still be competing with a slew of other developing nations for this attention. 

WTO regulatory reform could help, but there are a number of other hurdles that foreign investors face including ongoing corruption, interruptions in electricity, poor infrastructure and the fact that it’s landlocked.  Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’s thorny relationship will likely not improve in the future, nor will Afghanistan’s safety as a transit nation.  Adjusting to the new WTO regulations will not be painless or quick.  Capitalizing on the benefits of the global marketplace will require Tajikistan to pursue much more important and difficult issues than trade reform.

To start, approximately ten suspected militants have been arrested in Tajikistan on suspicion of involvement with Islamic terrorist groups. Six are from a border near Afghanistan and thought to be involved with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, The IMU was formed in 1991, and today is primarily located in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas.

IMU is (obviously) still active in Tajikistan, but it’s been greatly weakened in the past decade thanks to a ban on it in Central Asian countries and the deaths of many members, including the two co-founders, in the Afghan war with US-led Coalition forces. That being said, the group is not one to counted out, as this Foreign Policy article makes clear. IMU is “one of the most militarily capable and media-savvy militant outlets operating in the region.”  The goal of the IMU is to “retake all of the region’s lands that were previously ruled by  Muslims” – which is to say, the Indian subcontinent – this is obviously a clear geographic shift in priorities, as their name would suggest otherwise, but recent news articles indicate the focus of the IMU has indeed turned away from Central Asia.

The Voice of Russia expressed concern that there will be an increase in terrorist activity as Tajikistan prepares for presidential elections in November. However, given that the elections aren’t likely to change much in Tajikistan, this concern may be one of the lesser problems Tajikistan currently faces.

To understand more about Central Asia and the terrorist threat it faces, I strongly suggest reading Nathan Barrick’s article on Registan about the reality of terrorism in Central Asia.

Next up: military bases in Tajikistan. EurasiaNet’s Josh Kucera detailed an agreement to extend Russia’s lease of a military base, their largest in Central Asia. The lease will be extended (which is what Russia wanted) in return for duty-free fuel shipments to Tajikistan. These shipments will triple the amount of oil products Tajikistan will receive and begins immediately after the agreement is signed. If the agreement goes through, this will (hopefully) alleviate some of the dire fuel shortages Tajikistan experiences (especially as Russia demanded a guarantee that the fuel would not be re-exported). However, nothing is signed and sealed yet. As Kucera points out, before the agreement on the base can be finalized, the two countries still need to discuss “looser regulations on labor migrants from Tajikistan to Russia.”

Finally, a slideshow from the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. Because many of our readers want to ‘see’ Central Asia, this is the best we can do right now – here are some photos of everyday life in the Ferghana valley, a place where Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan blur together and borders are disputed. This can cause issues for those living there, as they navigate what can be a contentious political issue at the borders. We’ve linked to Global Voices, who provides a short caption of the show, but here is the actual slideshow, from Kloop (with Russian Subtitles, but you don’t need to read Russian to enjoy the photos.)

The AGRI agreement could draw a stark, and very interesting contrast, between the current monopolistic natural gas economics in Eurasia and a more competitive LNG market with greater contract, and therefore, price as well as supply flexibility. As noted by Dmitry Shlapentokh of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute regarding the development “…gas delivery by pipeline also has serious economic and geopolitical setbacks. Not only does it limit the room for maneuver of customers who currently depend on only a few sources of gas; it also creates a serious problem for suppliers who need to secure long-term contracts to compensate for the huge investment in constructing the pipelines.”

Pipeline siting and financing face a classic project dilemma in which many parties benefits from the project’s completion (all downstream consumers as well as upstream suppliers), but it is unclear at the time of siting exactly who should pay for how much of the project or which specific parts.  Long-term contracts help reduce risk, but also handcuff consumers and suppliers into prices that may turn out to be much higher or lower than true market prices in the future.  Further confounding matters is the inability of upstream providers to even guarantee production in the future, as has been a commonly cited concern with the Nabucco Pipeline.  In many cases uncertainty and risk lead to an unwillingness to invest.  A similar problem exists in siting disputes for international (or in the case of the US, interstate) electricity commerce.    

Despite the investment hurdles associated with developing LNG liquefaction terminals (US EIA puts the cost at $1.5 – $10 billion in the States and estimates rest around $1 billion for construction in the Caucasus) and the price of LNG tankers (slated to hit $220 million in 2013), LNG avoids these pitfalls.  While rates for LNG differ significantly around the world, market forces of supply and demand do weigh into prices unlike under a point-A-to-point-B pipeline regime.  Rather than binding countries together by piping and contracts, LNG transporters can reroute supplies to capture appealing market rates. 

If successful, AGRI will significantly weaken Russia’s leverage over both gas exports from Turkmenistan and its downstream customers in Central and Eastern Europe.  Currently, 20% of all of Europe’s gas comes from Russia via Ukraine.  Europeans well remember the long cold winters of 2006 and 2009 when Russia cut off natural gas supplies through Ukraine due to ongoing debt disputes are likely to prefer some supply insurance in the future. 

Upstream, Turkmenistan would be able to export its abundant natural gas to thirsty European markets without traversing Kazakhstan, Russia or Iran.  This could be considered a benefit for the developing Central Asian nation, however, it also will provide a greater cushion for President Berdimuhamedov to uphold the human rights violations started under Niyazov. 

British-owned oil and gas consultancy Penspen was due to produce analysis of the gas market and gas supply, an economic and financial analysis, an engineering concept for the necessary pipelines and LNG terminals, risk and environmental impact assessments of the project in November 2012, but has slipped behind schedule.  If the numbers line up, geopolitics in the region could shift significantly in years to come as LNG erodes Russia’s middleman status.  

The most recent one out of the region is as intriguing as ever:

Aslan Usoyan — aka Ded Khasan — was one of the highest-ranking figures in the Soviet-era and post-Soviet underworld, and his assassination by a sniper on January 16 threatens to leave a vacuum that could spark a mob war.

The article goes on to speculate about his killing and the shock waves it will create. It’s well worth a read, and left me, as a reader, wondering  - who are these mysterious gangsters of the post-Soviet world? Will Russia descend into a turf war, and how would that play out, and would subsequent events even be covered by the media in Putin’s Russia?

So, here they are: the decidedly un-romantic gangsters of Russia and the Caucasus, with thanks to RFE/RL’s article and the blog ‘In Moscow’s Shadows’ on the killing of Aslan Usoyan for giving us the idea and the names to work from.

Aslan Usoyan, Photo from RT

Usoyan, termed “Russia’s Don” by The Independent, was a Kurdish Georgian known as Grandpa Khasan, indicative of his role as a patriarchal figurehead on the organized crime hierarchy. It is thought that he was killed by members of rival Georgian organized crime group whose leader, Tariel Oniani, is behind bars, and there are concerns that Usoyan/Khasan’s death will spark revenge killings of rival groups. He was murdered outside of his favorite restaurant, a reportedly ‘kitschy’ Azerbaijani restaurant and the gun used, a Val sniper rifle, is apparently favored by the Russian special forces. He reportedly rose to power by being the keeper of an emergency fund used for jailed Russian criminals, and is known for having personal connections outside of politics.

Photo from mysouth.su

Tariel Oniani, the rival Georgian speculated to be behind the assassination of Usoyan, was vying for construction contracts for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, southern Russia. Oniani and the assassinated Usoyan have been in dispute as far back as 2006, according to some reports and the approach of the Olympics was intensifying their dispute. In 2010, he was sentenced to 10 years in jail on charges of kidnapping and extortion, but he continues to run his criminal empire from prison, most of which is reportedly centered around suspect construction dealings. He’s believed to be behind the assassination at least one other crime boss (link in Russian) from Russia, who sided with Usoyan following a mediation attempt between the two crime lords.

Dimtry Chanturia (also called Miron) is set to succeed the recently assassinated Aslan Usoyan, and his nephew. Little information is available about Miron to the casual observer, except that he has been hand-selected and groomed by Usoyan to take over the criminal empire left behind. With the powerful and experienced Oniani likely to vie for control over Usoyan’s network, some have questioned Chanturia’s ability to hold the criminal empire together.

Taken from today.az

Rovshan Janiyev is called the Azeri Godfather, and reportedly also had beef with Usoyan and masterminded a previous assassination attempt that failed. Janiyev’s empire is transnational, spanning Russia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. He is reportedly trying to increase his territory and expand his business markets, provoking the older, more established criminal orders

Taken from publico.es

Finally, Zakhar Kalashov, another Georgian who was formerly allied with the assassinated Usoyan but, according to ‘In Moscow’s Shadows’ the two were increasingly seen as rivals. He was arrested in Spain as part of a massive crackdown on Russian mafia members, but extradited back to Georgia in 2010. He was also wanted for money laundering in the United Arab Emirates.

The ‘Russian Mafia’ – made up of a variety of ethnic groups and from many countries – is extremely powerful, and with the new and much-needed expansion of Sochi for the Olympics, there are many incentives for mobsters to move in on this new territory and attempt to break up Usoyan’s empire. Some analysts have feared a return to the mob warfare seen in the 90s, though others are hoping that the godfathers of various factions will come together and attempt to fill the power vacuum “peacefully.” The latter seems more of a long shot, especially with such a massive empire potentially up for grabs.

Tense borders make regions inherently volatile, and having a Uzbek border inside of Kyrgyzstan magnifies the issue. Uzbekistan tightly controls passage through Sokh, which lies on a major transport route. Additionally, Sokh is dependent on people moving in and out of it to seek economic opportunity, so persistent tension on the border is a given. In this light, it’s not surprising that a crisis broke out in Sokh this weekend. This crisis has (thus far) not resulted in any reported deaths and appears to have been resolved, though injuries have been reported.

RFE/RL and EurasiaNet have already covered the skirmishes here and here, so to avoid repetition, here’s a quick summary:

On January 5th, RFE/RL reported that residents of Sokh (controlled by Uzbekistan, so Uzbek citizens) attacked Kyrgyz border guards who were installing power lines, presumably in protest to their construction. The border guards then fired warning shots into the air to disperse the crowd,

The next day, on January 6th, a group of Uzbek citizens from Sokh returned to the border post and took Kyrgyz citizens as hostages. In the early morning and later in the afternoon of January 7th, the approximately 40 hostages were returned back Kyrgyzstan’s authorities.

David Trilling of EurasiaNet points out more recent incidents in Sokh, including a shooting on January 4th of an Kyrgyz smuggler by Uzbek border guards – an event that likely contributed to making the environment in Sokh more vulnerable to disruption this past weekend.

RFE/RL also did a contextual look at the Sokh district, examining the two decades of tensions surrounding the tiny Uzbek territory:

In 1999, Tashkent determined that militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) were using Sokh as a base of operations against both countries. Uzbekistan significantly increased its military presence in the exclave and began mining its borders. Kyrgyzstan claims that mines have been laid in Kyrgyz territory and that Uzbek soldiers periodically terrorize local civilians on both sides of the border. Several Kyrgyz citizens have been killed by mines or gunfire while trying to cross Sokh.

Within this little enclave, larger conflicts brewing between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are manifested. The two countries are simmering with disagreements, such as resource control, border issues and power struggles. All of these larger regional dynamics are irregularly played out in the 350 square km of Sokh, primarily at the expense of residents and laypeople.

For additional reading on the differences between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, have a look at this article from UzNews, an independent Uzbek news source. It chronicles the daily differences between life in the capitals of each respective country, including something as basic as ‘people sit freely under some monument and no-one is hassling anyone’ (Bishkek).